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Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case
for the Limitation of Deceptive
Police Interrogation Practices in
the United States
ABSTRACT

In the United States, police officers regularly employ
deceptive interrogation tactics to extract confession evidence
from suspects. Despite widespread recognition of the harm
caused by police deception, courts in the United States have
consistently condoned the practice, refusing to exclude
confessions obtained through manipulativeand deceitful means.
The British Parliament has recognized that deceptive police
practices yield false confessions and, thus, wrongful convictions.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 addresses this
concern by establishingclear rules for the police to follow and by
empowering courts to enforce those rules. In evaluating the
need for reform in American police interrogationpolicy, English
law provides a valuable model for comparison. Taking a cue
from the English, this Note proposes the creation of a new
legislative framework focused on the reliability of confession
evidence. The Note will argue that the new law should include
guidelines for the police to follow in conducting interrogations
and that those guidelines should prohibit the types of deceptive
practices that lead to unreliable results.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Touted as the public's civic guardians, law enforcement officers
seek to protect and preserve the values of a just society. But, acting
under the guise of this duty to protect, the police may assume guilt
first and ask questions later,' disregarding the American justice
system's guiding principle of "innocent until proven guilty." Once
identified as a suspect, a person becomes the enemy and the effort to
extract a confession begins.2 Police will tell lies to uncover the truth;
they will deceive, fabricate, and manipulate until the suspect
surrenders-methods that are all perfectly legal.3 The deceptive
tactics employed by the police potentially cloud the value of
4
confession evidence and raise serious concerns about reliability.

1.
FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 67-68,
599 (4th ed. 2001); see also People v. Fitzgerald, 152 N.E. 542, 544 (Il. 1926) ("A
confession is not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that it was elicited by
questions put by police officers .
, even though the questions assumed the prisoner's
guilt.").
2.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 152 N.E. at 543-44 (police are able to ask questions
that assume the defendant's guilt).
3.
See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 484-87, 607 (describing
interrogation procedures that may involve trickery or deceit); Laurie Magid, Deceptive
Police InterrogationPractices:How Far is too Far?,99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (2001)
(describing a variety of deceptive techniques used by interrogators including "good cop,
bad cop" techniques, pretending a photocopier is a "truth machine," and creating false
evidence).
4.
See infra Part II.
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Still, judges support these practices by admitting the resulting
confessions as evidence, 5 because in America honesty is not police
policy.
In Europe, police officers pursue confessions with equal zeal but
employ different means to achieve the desired end.6 The modern
framework for police interrogations in England, established by the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE), focuses on the
search for truth by seeking reliable confessions through the use of fair
police practices. 7 Rather than leaving the courts to delve into the
emotional state of every defendant who challenges a confession,
English law establishes a uniform standard for the police to follow
when conducting interrogations. 8 To determine the admissibility of
confession evidence, the English courts consider whether police
officers have complied with PACE guidelines. 9
While some trickery by the police may be permissible under the
provisions of PACE, English courts have held that the intentional
misrepresentation of evidence is unfair and violates the law.' 0
Because this type of police deception compromises the veracity of a
suspect's statements, English judges routinely exclude any
confessions gained through deception as unreliable. 1 1 Although
research suggests that the use of fabricated evidence is rare in
English interrogations, 12 PACE enforces the prohibition by requiring

5.
Deborah A. Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28
CONN. L. REV. 425, 426 (1996); see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298-99 (1990)
(admitting confession after police posed as a cellmate); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.
564, 575-77 (1987) (upholding the confession of a suspect who was misinformed about
the subject matter of the investigation); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96
(1977) (holding admissible a confession from a suspect after police lied about finding
suspect's fingerprints at the scene); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969)
(upholding confession after police falsely told the suspect that his colleague had
confessed); Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and
European Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS

42 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003).
6.
Aldert Vrij, "We Will Protect Your Wife and Child, But Only If You Confess"
Police Interrogations in England and the Netherlands, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS, supra note 5, at 55, 56.
7.
See JOHN SPRACK, EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4-5 (9th ed. 2002).
8.
Id.

9.
Id. at 7.
10.
See Vrij, supra note 6, at 56 (stating that it is implied that evidence
obtained by deceit and trickery cannot be admitted into evidence in courts in England).
11.
See generally id. at 55-79 (discussing interrogation procedures in England).
12.
PETER MIRFIELD, SILENCE, CONFESSIONS AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE 11 (1997) (explaining that evidence indicates that the use of manipulative
techniques has declined since the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act);
Slobogin, supra note 5, at 43.
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the police to record every interview. 13 Even a violation of the
recording requirement itself can result in the exclusion of a
14
confession from trial.
Although commentators have criticized deceptive police practices
for decades, 15 American jurisprudence continues to overlook what
English courts have long recognized: deceptive police practices yield
false confessions and, thus, wrongful convictions. 16 Confessions
gained through police deception are often factually inaccurate and
English law limits the use of these deceptive
untrustworthy.17
practices by establishing clear rules for the police to follow and
empowering courts to enforce those rules.' 8 PACE artfully balances
police and prosecutorial interests with the fair and reliable
administration of justice. 19 In evaluating the need for reform in
American police interrogation policy, English law provides a valuable
model for comparison.
This Note advocates for the reform of American interrogation
law and proposes the creation of a new legislative framework focused
on the reliability of confession evidence. The Note argues that the
new law should include guidelines for the police to follow in
conducting interrogations and identify the types of deceptive
practices that will lead to unreliable results. Part II addresses the
wide-ranging problems associated with the current use of deceptive
interrogation techniques in the United States. Part III defines and
discusses the different types of deceptive police practices, which range
from expressions of sympathy to the presentation of false evidence.
Part IV provides a brief history of the common law on police
interrogation and compares the current status of the law in the
United States with the law in England. Lastly, Part V proposes a
solution that borrows from the English legal system without
compromising the strength of American law enforcement.

13.
Code of Practice on Audio Recording Interviews with Suspects (Code E),
3.1 (promulgated under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 67, pt. VI
(Eng.)) [hereinafter Code E].
14.
See Slobogin, supranote 5, at 43.
15.
See, e.g., Magid, supra note 3, at 1169-70 (describing the criticism of
commentators and the popular press of the false confessions that arise from the use of
deceptive interrogation techniques); Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation,3
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 9 (1996) (advocating the prohibition of any lies during
questioning); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111, 148 (1997)
(advocating substantial limits on deception by proposing that police be prohibited from
presenting false forensic evidence).
16.
White, supranote 15, at 111.
17.

Id.

18.
See SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4-7 (describing how PACE develops a
framework for the exercise of police powers and how it is enforced).
19.
See id. (noting that PACE sets out the framework for the exercise of police
powers, accounts for the public interest and provides enforcement methods for courts).
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II. THE COSTS OF DECEPTION
Without a doubt, investigators routinely secure powerful
confession evidence through the use of trickery, deceit, manipulation,
and false evidence. 20 However, in a society that generally views lying
as immoral and wrong, deliberate dishonesty displayed by police
officers raises serious concerns. The use of deception hurts not only
the innocent suspect but also the lying police officer, the prosecuting
attorney, and the criminal justice system as a whole. To address the
need for the reform of American interrogation law, it is necessary to
first consider the dangers associated with the use of deceptive
techniques, including: (1) false confession, (2) evidentiary harm, (3)
detrimental reliance, and (4) institutional harm.
A. False Confession
Modern psychological studies have indicated that the use of
coercive interrogation techniques may result in one of two types of
false confessions. 21 "Coerced-compliant" confessions are those in
which a suspect knowingly offers a false confession in order to obtain
some goal or to escape from a stressful situation. 22 For example, the
suspect begins to feel hopeless and produces a false confession in an
attempt to secure a lighter penalty when a police officer confronts
him with false forensic evidence.. On the other hand, "coercedinternalized" false confessions occur when deceptive tactics alter a
suspect's mental condition so severely that the innocent suspect
actually believes in his own guilt. 23 In a distressed and vulnerable
state, .the suspect begins to confuse reality with the story that the
police officer presents.2 4 Both types of false confessions occur as a
result of deceptive police practices and can lead to devastating
Even a guilty person may
consequences for innocent suspects.
confess falsely in response to deceptive police practices, changing the
25
details of his story to fit the suggestion of his interrogator.
Although the admission of guilt itself may be true, a suspect's
statements will prove unreliable if coercive police tactics influenced
26
the suspect's description of the facts.

20.
See Magid, supra note 3, at 1169 ("Commentators have sought to show that
deception causes many false confessions."); White, supra note 15, at 108-09 & n.26
(describing how suspects have claimed that interrogation techniques have led them to
falsely confess).
21.
White, supranote 15, at 109.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Richard P. Conti, The Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. CREDIBILITY
ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 14, 22-23 (1999).

25.
26.

White, supra note 15, at 109.
Id.

1034

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42.'1029

In recent years, the phenomenon of the false confession has
gained increasing attention as a serious problem for the American
criminal justice system. 27 "Over the past two decades, a significant
number of suspects have claimed that police interrogation techniques
have led them to give false confessions. '28 Between 1973 and 1996,
Professors Leo and Ofshe collected several dozen case histories of
wrongful convictions due to false confessions. 29
Although the
frequency of psychologically induced false confession remains
uncertain, 30 scholars have discovered that they occur often enough to
warrant major concern. 31 Empirical data indicates that confessions
induced by standard police interrogation tactics are frequently
untrustworthy and that these tactics cause a significant number of
false confessions. 32
Leo and Ofshe argue that "when police
interrogate suspects whose guilt is a mere possibility rather than a
reasonable likelihood, they run a significant risk of eliciting a false
33
confession.
The harm that results from false confessions is plain. Policeinduced false confessions lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration of the innocent. 34 Additionally, "false
confessions are likely to lead to unjust deprivations of liberty . . .
because jurors treat confession evidence with such deference that the
confession usually outweighs strong evidence of a defendant's
innocence. '35 With an admission in hand, a prosecutor is better able

27.
See Magid, supra note 3, at 1169-70 (showing that deception causes false
confessions and has captured the attention of the academic community and the press).
28.
White, supranote 15, at 108.
29.
See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 435-38 (1998)
(explaining the methodology of the study) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of
False Confessions]; Magid, supranote 3, at 1191 n.109.
30.
Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 29, at 431-32.
Professors Leo and Ofshe attribute this uncertainty to several factors: there is no
organization to collect data about the number of interrogations that take place
annually or evaluate the reliability of those confession; most interrogations that lead to
disputed confessions are not recorded; and the truth about what happened in an
interrogation may remain in dispute after a defendant has plead guilty or been
convicted. Id.
31.
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat
Miranda:Another Reply to Paul Cassell,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 561 (1998)
[hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Using the Innocent]; see Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False
Confessions, supra note 29, at 430 (1998) (arguing that the problems caused by policeinduced confession are significant and recurrent).
32.
White, supra note 15, at 131.
33.
Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 986 (1997).
34.
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A
Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (1997) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest].
35.
Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions,supra note 29, at 494.
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to secure a conviction in a case that may otherwise be based on
tenuous evidence. 36 A confession is also a powerful chip in the plea
bargaining process. 37 Fearing a near certain conviction, an innocent
person will often accept punishment in hopes of facing a lighter
sentence.
B. Evidentiary Harm
The use of deceptive tactics by the police creates a risk that any
resulting confession, regardless of its basis in truth, will be excluded
from trial. Although a low likelihood exists of innocent people
confessing to a crime, regardless of the police tactics used against
them, the practice of deceptive interrogation techniques compromises
the validity of any admission. 38 Because courts may exclude coerced
confessions from trial, confessions resulting from deceptive
interrogations are less valuable than those obtained without
deception. 39 By using deceptive interrogation techniques, a police
officer risks losing valuable confession evidence against the
defendant.
Aside from the exclusion of confession evidence at trial, deceptive
police tactics may also result in the loss of other important evidence,
by discouraging cooperation from suspects who feel betrayed by police
dishonesty. As officers question possible suspects, they may use
deception under the assumption that lying to a suspect early in the
investigation bears little cost. 40
If the suspect is innocent or
unresponsive to the interrogation techniques, the only significant cost
endured by the officer is time wasted. However, lying to innocent
people potentially destroys the trust that is essential to encouraging
future cooperation. 4 1 When innocent people feel betrayed by the
police, they become reticent to help in the investigation and are more
likely to fail to disclose critical evidence. 42 Because the police often
rely on these initial suspects to testify as witnesses, the appearance of
impropriety and dishonesty at the outset could be fatal to the
43
development of an effective case against the defendant.

36. "
37.
38.
39.

See id. (stating that confessions can outweigh strong evidence of innocence).
See id.
See Young, supranote 5, at 462-63.
Id. at 461.

40.

Id. at 457.

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
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C. DetrimentalReliance
"Sociological studies confirm that law enforcement officers rely
heavily on the deceptive practices taught in interrogation manuals,"
to the exclusion of other investigative strategies. 44 In fact, lies and
trickery essentially have replaced physical brutality as the favored
Justice Felix Frankfurter
technique to secure confessions. 45
the burden of proving
our
system,
society
carries
remarked, "Under
its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must
establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under
judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation. '46 Permitting the use of false evidence creates
the danger that skillful investigation becomes secondary.
Allowing the police to lie during interrogation may also cause the
47
unintended effect of promoting lying in other circumstances.
Dishonest interrogators rationalize lying based on the notion that the
deception is necessary to further the interests of society. 48 Their
justification for such conduct is derived from a pursuit of the public
good. 49 However, such reasoning could excuse any lie made for the
public good, including lies told outside of the interrogation room.50
For example, an officer may extend the same justification to lying on
an affidavit for a search warrant or in testimony before a grand
jury. 51 The fact that courts condone lying in some police activities but
staunchly prohibit any deception in other activities sends an
inconsistent message about the values of the criminal justice system
52
and the expectations of its officers.

44.
Paris, supra note 15, at 61.
45.
Id.; see also Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing
Nature or Police Interrogationin America, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 37 (1992)
[hereinafter Leo, From Coercion to Deception] (noting that the use of deception has, in
effect, become a functional alternative to the use of coercion).
46.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
47.
See Young, supra note 5, at 463.
48.
Id.
49.

Id.

50.
Id.
51.
See Jennifer Hunt & Peter K. Manning, The Social Context of Police Lying,
14 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 51, 56 (1991) (reporting that the most common form of lying
by police involves "the construction of probable cause for arrest, or search and seizure
in situations where the legally required basis.., is weak or absent").
52.
See generally Young, supra note 5, at 451 (describing how courts can elect
to allow police lying at their discretion).

2009]

HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY

D. InstitutionalHarm
The practice of police deception runs contrary not only to widely
held beliefs about right and wrong, but also to the ideals of the
American criminal justice system. The promise of the presumption of
innocence leads American citizens to believe that officers of the law
and the court will treat suspects as innocent until proven guilty. But
the prevalence of deceptive police practices suggests the opposite
conclusion. The police usually assume guilt right from the start; they
seek quick confessions and certain convictions. 53 In the view of the
police, the primary goal of the criminal justice system may be to
convict the guilty. But, the pursuit of such convictions through
deceptive tactics threatens the integrity of the criminal justice
system. 54 The dissenting justices in People v. Martin aptly stated
that the admission into evidence of an interrogator's lie would "serve
' 55
to denigrate and demean the judicial process.
Deliberate misrepresentations compromise the integrity of the
police system as a whole, but these misrepresentations also hurt the
individuals involved in the deception. When a police officer lies to
achieve a certain result, he may experience a loss of self-respect and
feelings of regret. 56 "Novice police [officers] have admitted their
dismay at being expected to lie as part of their jobs. ' 57 Although,
with time, individual police officers may accept even the most
outrageous of police practices as routine, initial feelings of dismay
signal that deceptive practices are contrary to societal norms of right
and wrong.

III. THE PALLET OF POLICE DECEPTION: FROM FALSE
SYMPATHY TO FALSE EVIDENCE

In the course of an interrogation, a police officer may use a wide
variety of deceptive techniques to obtain a confession from the
suspect. 58 Since Miranda v. Arizona places an affirmative obligation
on police officers to inform suspects of their right to remain silent and
to consult with counsel,5 9 police officers generally avoid deception
regarding the rights of a suspect. Instead, police officers may opt to

53.
INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 67-68.
54.
Young, supra note 5, at 457 (arguing that a simultaneous goal to that of
convicting the guilty is to uphold a fair and ethical criminal justice system).
55.
People v. Martin, 466 N.E.2d. 228, 236 (111. 1984) (Goldernhersh, J.,
dissenting).
56.
Young, supra note 5, at 468.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 429.
59.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
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lie during the interrogation itself.60 The police may trick the suspect
by (1) showing false sympathy, (2) manipulating the suspect's
perception of culpability, (3) deceiving the suspect regarding the
circumstances, (4) lying about the strength of the case, or (5) even
fabricating forensic evidence. 6 1 The type of deception employed by
62
interrogators largely depends on the objective of the questioning.
A. False Sympathy or Flattery
One of the most common interrogation strategies that police
routinely employ is the process of building a rapport with the
suspect. 63 Although building rapport is not inherently deceptive, the
investigator typically uses the practice as a vehicle for securing a
confession.64 By making gestures and offering statements to signal
his honesty and sincerity, an interrogator creates an atmosphere of
trust and openness. 65 An officer may imply or even state directly that
he sympathizes with the suspect, regardless of his personal feelings,
in an effort to gain a suspect's trust. 66 Often, this rapport-building
technique is paired with other types of deception to secure a
confession.67
In order to foster a suspect's trust, interrogators
frequently use an interrogation technique known as the '"Mutt and
Jeff' or "good cop/bad cop" routine.6 8 In this scenario, two police
officers question one suspect. 69 One interrogator pretends to be
highly adversarial, while the other plays the role of the friendly police
officer. The empathetic interrogator essentially promises to save the
suspect from the nasty interrogator, which leads the reluctant
70
suspect to trust that the good cop will protect him.
Some interrogation manuals even suggest flattering the suspect
in an attempt to elicit a confession. 71 Compliments directed toward
the suspect by the interrogator work to "defuse the natural

60.
Young, supra note 5, at 429.
61.
Leo, From Coercion to Deception, supra note 45, at 43-47; Young, supra
note 5, at 429-33.
62.
Young, supra note 5, at 429.
63.
See INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 93-94 (describing how to establish
rapport).
64.
See id. at 93 (describing the importance of establishing rapport with a
suspect).
65.
Id.
66.
Leo, From Coercion to Deception, supra note 45, at 45.
67.
See id. (describing the use of a variety of interrogation techniques to build
and exploit the trust of the suspect).
68.
Id.
69.
Susan E. Brodt & Marla Tuchinsky, Working Together But in Opposition:
An Examination of the "Good-Cop/Bad-Cop"NegotiatingTeam Tactic, 81 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 155, 156 (2000).

70.

Id.

71.

See INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 268-69.
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adversarial relationship that exists between the two." 72 In the
absence of a friendly relationship, people often find it much easier to
justify lying-particularly lying to people whom they resent. 73 As a
result, complimenting the suspect and feigning admiration
encourages the suspect to return the sentiment and effectively
establish a rapport. Once such a relationship74is established, the
positive emotional attachment discourages lying.
Although showing sympathy for an accused murderer or feigning
camaraderie with a rapist does involve deception, the result of the
deception merely creates an environment where the suspect feels
safe. While such an environment may lead a guilty suspect ultimately
to confess, that feeling of safety probably will not create the type of
desperation, fear, or hopelessness that would lead to a false or
unreliable confession.
B. MisrepresentationsAbout Culpability
To induce a confession, interrogation manuals suggest lying
about the appropriateness of a suspect's conduct in order to persuade
the suspect that the criminal conduct was less blameworthy than he
might fear. 75 Step Two of the widely followed Reid Nine Steps of
Interrogation instructs an interrogator to "Sympathize with the
Suspect by Saying that Anyone Else Under Similar Conditions or
Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing. '76 For example,
an interrogator may tell a rape suspect that he had "roughed it up
with a girl" himself in order to have sex with her. 77 A person derives
"mental relief and comfort" from an investigator's assurance that
others would behave similarly. 78 The investigator's assurance allows
the suspect to justify or excuse the behavior in his own mind. 79 The
comfort that the suspect feels as a result of the investigator's
assurances "offers an added incentive to obtain even greater relief'
80
through a confession.
The police may also lie about the victim's conduct by suggesting
that the victim initiated or consented to the suspect's actions. For
example, a 50-year-old man, accused of having taken indecent
liberties with a 10-year-old girl, was told during his interrogation:
"This girl is well advanced for her age. She probably learned a lot

72.
73.
74.
confession
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 269.
See id. (stating that flattering remarks can be helpful in obtaining a
of guilt).
Id. at 213, 232-33, 241-42, 244.
Id. at 241.
See id. at 251, ex. 13-1.
Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
Id.
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about sex from the boys in the neighborhood and from the movies and
TV; and knowing what she did about sex, she may have deliberately
then
tried to excite you to see what you would do."''s The offender
82
confessed and blamed the victim for inciting his behavior.
Similar to expressions of sympathy and flattery, police deception
about the suspect's culpability creates an environment where a guilty
However,
person feels more comfortable confessing to a crime.
sympathy and flattery likely fail in creating the type of environment
that induces an innocent person to confess. Because this type of
deception likely would not result in an unreliable confession, the
harm under this practice is limited.
C. Misleading Circumstances
The police may also lie about the circumstances of an
interrogation, such as the identity of the interrogator or the privacy of
the setting. In one case, a police officer impersonated an Army officer
to obtain a confession from a suspect who was on leave from the
Army.8 3 Such an impersonation is most often utilized when a suspect
will not speak with the police.8 4 Knowing that the suspect would be
more comfortable with an Army officer, and thus more likely to
confess to the crime, the police officer lied about his identity to gain
the suspect's trust.8 5 In another case, the police granted a suspect
ten minutes to converse with a co-suspect regarding a possible joint
statement by the two.8 6 The police officers assured both suspects that
they could speak together in a soundproof room.8 7 Thinking that
their conversation would remain private, they made damaging
statements during the meeting.8 8 Meanwhile, the police had placed a
recording device in the room.8 9 At trial, the court allowed a police
officer to testify regarding the contents of the conversation.9"
Lying to a suspect about an interrogator's identity or the privacy
of the location will do little more than alter the suspect's perceived
environment, usually creating impressions of increased comfort. Of
course, a guilty suspect may more readily confess to a person with
whom he feels more at ease. Such a relaxed interaction, however,
should not exert enough pressure on an innocent suspect such that
the suspect would feel compelled to confess. An officer's role-playing

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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simply creates an opportunity for the suspect to let down his guard
and make admissions he might not otherwise make. If faced with the
question regarding the reliability of a confession, a judge likely would
not find the police officer's role-playing sufficient to exclude the
confession.
D. Lies About the Strength of the Case
Police officers may suggest the existence of some unidentified
independent evidence establishing guilt in an effort to mislead the
suspect about the strength of their case against him. This suggestion
is misleading if the officer lacks any independent source of
information. However, the lie does not necessitate the fabrication of
any actual evidence. Some interrogation manuals suggest that "the
investigator should state, or intimate, that there are independent
means to detect any lies told."9 1 For instance, the interrogator may
tell the suspect, "This morning, we will begin getting the results back
from the crime lab on hair and fiber analysis found at the scene. At
that point, we will have definitive information as to who committed
'92
the crime.
Lies about the strength of the case have the potential to cause
significant distress for a suspect, but only if the suspect has reason to
fear that incriminating facts may be uncovered. If a guilty suspect
believes that the police are bound to discover the truth, he may
choose to confess earlier in hopes of leniency. But, it seems unlikely
that such misrepresentations would do more than create an
opportunity for the defendant to question the wisdom of maintaining
his innocence. When confronted with the possibility of imminent lab
results, an innocent suspect has nothing to fear. In fact, an innocent
suspect may even feel relieved that corroborating forensic evidence
will confirm his innocence. As a result, the harm from this deceptive
practice is also limited.
E. The Presentationof False Evidence
The presentation of false evidence takes two main forms:
deceptive oral assertions and fabrication of physical evidence. The
first form of false evidence relies on oral assertions by the police
officer that are intended to induce a confession without requiring the
production of physical evidence. 93 To convince the suspect that his
confession is unnecessary to prove guilt, the police may lie about

91.
Id. at 95.
92.
Id.
93.
See generally id. at 427-29 (discussing the purposes of introducing false
evidence during interrogations and the credibility of any confessions obtained by such
interrogation techniques).
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other sources of testimonial evidence. 94 Often, the police officer tells
the suspect that a co-defendant has confessed and implicated the
suspect in the crime. 95 Police may also tell a suspect that someone
witnessed the crime, the victim has identified the suspect, or the
murder weapon has been found. 96 Each of these tactics presents false
testimonial evidence against the suspect that, if true, would prove the
suspect's guilt.
When police are unsure that their words alone will induce a
confession, they sometimes present false physical evidence to bolster
their lies regarding the strength of the case. 9 7 False or fabricated
evidence may consist of fingerprint matches,98 blood samples, hair
analysis, and the like. Interrogators read fabricated test results to
suspects as if the tests were definitive proof of the suspect's guilt.99
The popular interrogation manual written by Inbau, Reid, Buckley,
and Jayne suggests that using "visual props" like a report file
containing blank pages, a plastic bag holding carpet fibers, or a
generic finger print card are permissible.10 0 The investigator may
"verbally tell the suspect that the file folder contains incriminating
evidence, that the carpet fibers match those in his home, or that the
fingerprints lifted from a vehicle were those of the suspect."'' 1
In one elaborate scheme, a police officer obtained a knife similar
to one that he believed to be the murder weapon. 10 2 The officer
smeared blood on the stand-in weapon and made a fingerprint in the
blood.' 0 3 He then had photographs of the fingerprint made and

94.
Id. at 429.
95.
Id. at 484.
96.
See United States ex rel. Galloway v. Fogg, 403 F. Supp. 248, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (noting that the defendant was falsely told by a police interrogator that there
was an outside witness); Moore v. Hooper, 389 F. Supp. 931, 935 (M.D. Ga. 1974)
(holding that misrepresentation that the gun was found did not render the confession
inadmissible); People v. Payton, 462 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (noting the
police interrogator falsely told the suspect that he had been identified by the victim).
97.
See id. at 427-28 ("In some cases an investigator may falsely imply, or
outright state, that evidence exists that links the suspect to the crime.").
98.
For cases in which police claimed that defendant's incriminating
fingerprints were found on the murder weapon or at the scene of the crime, see, for
example, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (police officer falsely informed
defendant that his fingerprints were found at the scene of a burglary, eliciting a
confession from defendant moments later) and Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 779 (11th
Cir. 1984) (evidence of police deceiving defendant by informing him that his
fingerprints were on the murder weapon and his footprint was found at the crime scene
allegedly excluded from hearing on voluntariness of defendant's confession to police),
rev'd on other grounds, Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (1lth Cir. 1986).
99.
See INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 428 (discussing the consequences of
implying to a rape suspect that the suspect had failed a DNA test).
100.

INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 610.

101.
102.
103.

Id.
State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d. 134, 143-44 (N.C. 1983).
Id. at 144.
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marked them as if fingerprint identification had been performed.1 0 4
Police used the bloody weapon and photographs to interrogate the
suspect, falsely stating that the fingerprints had been identified as
the suspect's.' 0 5 Despite these and other fraudulent representations,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the confession, finding
that the fraudulent representations were not likely to make an
06
innocent person confess.'
The presentation of false evidence poses a more severe threat
than other types of deceptive police practices. When a police officer
tells a suspect that physical evidence proves his guilt, accomplices
have already confessed, or the victim has identified him as the
assailant, even an innocent suspect may suffer an emotional
breakdown.
Faced with seemingly definitive proof of guilt, an
innocent suspect may begin to doubt his own sanity. In a desperate
situation, a person may weigh the prudence of maintaining innocence
when it seems that everything is stacked against him. This type of
deception seems most likely to induce a false confession-where a
defeated and distraught suspect decides to surrender to escape an
impossible situation. The deceptive technique of presenting false
evidence thus jeopardizes the reliability of the resulting confession.

IV. FROM

TORTURE TO TRICKERY: THE HISTORY

OF POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICE

Although common law originally placed no limitations on
suspicious interrogation tactics, the 18th and 19th centuries saw
increased judicial concern regarding the reliability of confessions
obtained by abusive means.10 7 English courts led the way in 1783,
issuing the first decision to exclude a confession obtained "by the
flattery of hope or by the torture of fear.' 08 In determining the
reliability of confessions, English courts used an evidentiary
standard, asking whether (1) the defendant had been induced to
confess by a promise of benefit or threat of harm; (2) the defendant
had spoken under circumstances that impaired the reliability of
statements; or (3) the confession had been made voluntarily. 0 9 In
the early 19th century, American courts followed suit, evaluating

104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id. at 148.
107.
Magid, supra note 3, at 1172.
108.
The King v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B.); see also
Young, supra note 5, at 435 (noting the English decision as the first "formal
pronouncement" excluding a confession obtained in such a manner).
109.
Young, supra note 5, at 435 (quoting Developments in the Law: Confessions,
79 HARv. L. REV. 954, 954-55 (1966)).
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confessions on the basis of the evidentiary standard pronounced by
the English courts.1 10
In the mid-1800s, however, the American criminal justice system
began to veer from the course established by the English courts,
bringing in commissioned police to take over the traditionally private
role of apprehending and detaining criminals."'
Although the
magistrates of the court, consistent with the English system, had
originally served the function of suspect interrogation, the new
American police force replaced the magistrates in the investigation
process. 112 With the advent of police interrogation came a stark
change in the nature of interrogation tactics in the United States.
Unlike their judicial predecessors, police interrogators began to use
physical coercion and lying to induce confessions. 113 In the 1884 case
of Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court recognized that physically
abusive interrogation tactics might deprive the accused of "that
freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession
114
voluntary within the meaning of the law."
Still, law enforcement officials continued to abuse and torture
the accused in their efforts to extract confessions. In 1936, the
landmark case of Brown v. Mississippi finally announced a definitive
prohibition of the "rack and torture chamber" in police
interrogation." 5 Holding that police use of violence was "revolting to
the sense of justice," the Court announced that Due Process required
interrogation procedures that would yield voluntary and thus reliable
116
statements.
A few years after Brown, the Court extended the rule in
Chambers v. Florida,holding that, even when there was no physical
violence, persistent questioning and "other ingenious forms of
entrapment" could constitute compulsion. 117 In cases after Brown,
the "courts used a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis to determine
whether 'the interrogation was. . . unreasonable or shocking, or if the
accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational or
intelligent choice."' 118 "The totality of the circumstances test [for
voluntariness] required courts to consider: the conduct and actions of
the officers; the physical surroundings of the interrogation; and the

110.
111.

Young, supra note 5, at 435-36.
Id. at 437.

112.

Id. at 437-38.

113.
See id. at 438 ("With the shift from magistrates to police as interrogators,
techniques of interrogation also began to change. Physical coercion and lying by police
interrogators became part of the process.").
114.
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
115.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
116.
Id. at 286.
117.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940).
118.
Magid, supra note 3, at 1173 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
661 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
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characteristics and status of the defendant, including both physical
19
and mental condition."'
In the mid 1900s, the Court shifted its concern from a pure focus
on the voluntariness of confessions to a view that condemned police
practices likely to coerce confessions. 120 In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the
Court found coercion where police questioned a defendant for thirtysix hours without allowing the defendant to rest or sleep. 121 The
important change underlying the Court's reasoning in Ashcraft rested
in the fact that the Court did not explicitly find that the confession
was obtained by manipulating the defendant's will. 1 22 Instead, the
Court condemned the police conduct itself, finding it so "inherently
coercive" as to render the confession compelled and, as a result,
inadmissible. 1 23 In Ashcraft, the Court focused not on the individual
the past, but on the
characteristics of the defendant, as it had it in
124
reprehensible nature of the police questioning.
The Supreme Court first addressed police deception in the 1959
case of Spano v. New York. 125 In Spano, the defendant first confessed
to murder over the phone to a friend, Bruno--a student in the police
academy. 126 During the course of Spano's subsequent custodial
interrogations, the police used Bruno to deceive Spano into believing7
12
that his story was causing problems for Bruno and his family.
After eight hours of questioning, which included pleas from Bruno,
Spano confessed and was convicted.' 28 The Court applied a totality of
the circumstances test in evaluating the admissibility of the
confession, and held that official pressure, fatigue, and falsely
aroused sympathy rendered the confession involuntary. 129 The
Court's opinion emphasized the abhorrence of the police tactics
employed. 130 Similarly, in Rogers v. Richmond, the Court held that a
confession obtained by psychological coercion could not stand when

Id. (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(c), at 448
119.
(2d ed. 1999)).
120.
See generally Young, supra note 5, at 443-47 (discussing the Supreme
Court's increasing use of the Due Process clause to scrutinize police misbehavior as it
related to tending to coerce confessions).
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944).
121.
Id. at 154.
122.
Id. at 153-54.
123.
124.
Id. at 153-55.
125.
See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
126.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318-19.
127.
128.
Id. at 318-19, 322-23.
Id. at 323; see also Magid, supra note 3, at 1175 (describing how the Court
129.
in Spano applied the totality of the circumstances test).
130.
See id. at 320, 323-24 ("[The police were not therefore merely trying to
solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect, [but] . . . were rather concerned primarily
with securing a statement from defendant on which they could convict him.").
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to arrest Rogers's wife if he did not

In the 1960s, the Court's treatment of confessions moved
dramatically in the direction of protecting defendants' rights against
132
self-incrimination. In 1966, the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,
continuing to focus on the appropriateness of police practices. The
Court's conclusion that the Fifth Amendment's protection from
compulsory self-incrimination is "fully applicable during a period of
133
custodial interrogation" was unprecedented in constitutional law.
The Court's development of the Miranda warnings reflected the
134
recognition that all custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.
Explaining that modern police interrogation used psychological
rather than physical coercion, 135 the Court enumerated the standard
deceptive techniques espoused in at least five different popular
interrogation manuals. 136 The Court denigrated these deceptive
practices for contributing to impermissible coercion and laid the
13 7
foundation for further court-imposed limitations on police conduct.
In People v. Smith, a state court interpreted Miranda as
prohibiting lying by police in custodial interrogations. 138 In Smith,
the police had questioned the defendant about an injured child,
deliberately choosing not to disclose that the child had died. 139 The
court stated, "Clearly, the State has no right to extort confessions by
deliberate fraud or trickery.' 140 Just three years later, however, the
Supreme Court rejected the interpretation of Miranda as an absolute
prohibition of lying by police. 141

131.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535-36, 545 (1961).
132.
Miranda. v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966).
133.
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 120 (1993) (citing
Miranda,384 U.S. at 460).
134.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper
safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely.").
135.
Id. at 448.
136.
Id. at 449.
137.
Id. at 449-54; see also Young, supra note 5, at 450 (noting that Miranda's
"resounding criticism of police lying could have been the foundation for further courtimposed limitations on police conduct").
138.
See People v. Smith, 246 N.E.2d 689, 692-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ("At the
outset, we find that the 'trickery' contemplated in [Miranda] and other decisions cited
by the defendant, involve affirmative acts of fraud or deceit such as a
misrepresentation that a friend's job would be jeopardized if the defendant did not
confess....").
139.
Id. at 692.
140.
Id. at 693.
141.
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) ("The fact that the police
misrepresented the statements that Rawls had made is, while relevant, insufficient in
our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.").
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In the watershed case of Frazier v. Cupp, Frazier had been
indicted jointly with another defendant, Rawls, for murder. 142 After
both were arrested, police falsely told Frazier that Rawls had
confessed. 143 When Frazier asked for an attorney, the police stated,
"[Y]ou can't be in any more trouble than you are in now. '14 4 Frazier
gave a signed confession and the Court held that although the lies
were relevant, they did not make an otherwise voluntary confession
inadmissible. 14 5 Using a totality of the circumstances test, the court
found that the lies were not material for the purpose of assessing the
146
admissibility of the confession.
Following Frazier v. Cupp, both state and federal courts have
147
upheld the validity of trickery and deceit in suspect interrogations.
Courts have sustained the practice with respect to presenting false
fingerprint evidence, "playing one accomplice against another, placing
blame upon and condemning the victim, and lying to a murder
suspect that the victim is still alive.' 148 In Holland v. McGinnis, a
police officer exaggerated the strength of the case against the
defendant during an interrogation. 1 49 The court found that, even if
the misrepresentation caused the defendant to confess, it was not
inherently coercive and "insufficient by itself to render an otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible.' 150 The misrepresentation was
just one factor that the court considered in the totality of the
circumstances. 15i The Tenth Circuit, in Lucero v. Kerby, held that
without additional evidence, a detective's false statement about
fingerprint evidence would not render an otherwise voluntary
1 52
confession inadmissible.
Although courts have generally rejected the application of a per
se rule of inadmissibility due to deception, 15 3 a few courts have taken
a stand against the use of certain deceptive practices. In 1984, an
Illinois appellate court in People v. Payton154 delivered a holding
criticized by some as an aberration exhibiting "a gross misconception

142.
Id. at 733.
143.
Id. at 737.
144.
Id. at 738.
145.
Id. at 738-39.
146.
Id. at 739.
147.
See INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 608 (noting that both state and federal
courts have upheld the validity of a wide variety of practices that could be considered
trickery or deceit in a large number of instances).
148.
Id. at 608-09.
149.
Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992).
150.
Id. at 1051-52 (quoting Frazier,394 U.S. at 739).
151.
Id. at 1051.
152.
Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998).
153.

INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 610.

154.

People v. Payton, 462 N.E.2d 543, 545-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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of judicial precedent. '155 In Payton, the police interrogator had
falsely told the suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the
scene of a residential burglary and that the victim had positively
identified him. 156 In reversing the conviction, the court stated that "a
suspect grossly and intentionally misled as to the amount and
strength of the evidence against him may well be induced to confess
as a direct result of those misrepresentations. '157 Condemning the
interrogator's use of flagrant deceptive tactics, the court in Payton
held that the defendant's confession was properly excluded from
evidence. 158 Critics of the decision pointed to the appellate court's
erroneous citations to Miranda for the proposition that the Supreme
159
Court has disallowed the use of trickery.
Shortly after the Illinois appellate court's decision in Payton, the
Supreme Court of Illinois decided another case that sparked debate
about the detrimental effects of the use of deceit in inducing
confessions. 160
People v. Martin involved a defendant who had
confessed after being told by the interrogator that his accomplice
named him as "the trigger man." 161 Although four of the Illinois
Supreme Court justices opined that the interrogator's lie was not
enough to render the resulting conviction inadmissible, three justices
dissented, stating, "there is no difference in principle between the
withholding of evidence favorable to a defendant and the wilful,
knowing falsehood which tricked defendant into making the
statement."162
A. State of American Confession Law
Today, with no absolute prohibition of police deception during
interrogation, courts may admit confessions despite the use of
trickery, misrepresentation, lies, and false evidence.' 63 American
courts have abandoned the original common law approach to

155.
See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 610 (describing Payton as an
"outstanding aberration" and noting that it also grossly misconceived "the judicial
rationale for the allowance of trickery and deceit").
156.
Payton, 462 N.E.2d. at 544.
157.
Id. at 546.
158.
Id.
159.
See INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 610-11 (noting that in Miranda the
Supreme Court did not rule that trickery by police officers was categorically prohibited
in eliciting confessions from criminal suspects).
160.
See People v. Martin, 466 N.E.2d. 228, 236 (Ill. 1984) (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a knowing, voluntary waiver of a defendant's right to silence
could not have been made in a situation in which deceit on the part of police was
present); see also INBAU ET AL., supra note 1, at 612 (criticizing the decision in Martin).
161.
Martin, 466 N.E.2d. at 229.
162.
Id. at 236 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
163.
See Young, supra note 5, at 451 ("With no absolute prohibition of police
lying during interrogation, courts today are free to condone such lying.").
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interrogation law, refusing to consider the reliability of confession
evidence. 164
Instead, judges look to the voluntariness of the
defendant's statements, and apply an ill-defined totality of the
circumstances test to determine the admissibility of a confession. 165
This test determines "whether an examination of the totality of the
circumstances indicates that the conduct of the law enforcement
officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and to bring
about a confession that was not the product of a rational intellect and
a free will."'1 66 Police lying is necessarily only one of numerous
factors considered in determining voluntariness. 16 7 Because the test
is so flexible, courts can simply permit or reject confessions without
168
clear reasons.
In applying the totality of the circumstances test, courts have
taken different approaches. Some judges review police deception by
simply citing Frazier v. Cupp for the proposition that "false
statements by the police are insufficient to invalidate an otherwise
voluntary confession."'1 69 Such a review draws a bright line that
permits police lying. 170 Other courts engage in extensive balancing
tests, weighing the size or seriousness of the particular deception
17 1
along with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
Ultimately, courts have great latitude in determining the importance
of each factor within the totality of the circumstances. 172 Because the
current constitutional doctrine has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively
sanctioned, police deception during the investigative phase, federal
and state courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions to
find that almost no type of deception renders a confession per se
173
involuntary.

164.
See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that a
confession's lack of reliability is "a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum").
165.
Id.; see also Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of
Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979) ("The Court's general unwillingness to
articulate the policies underlying volitional terminology explains the ambiguity of
voluntariness doctrine .... "); Magid, supra note 3, at 1174 n.28 (indicating that the
vulnerabilities of a defendant is just one factor of the totality of the circumstances test).
166.
Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-85 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
167.
Young, supra note 5, at 451-52.
168.
Id. at 452.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
See id. at 452-53 (describing the different ways that courts apply the
totality of the circumstances test).
172.
Id. at 453.
173.
Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 781 (1997) ("The message to the police is that, as far as
the law is concerned, they have virtual carte blanche to engage in deceptive undercover
work.").
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B. State of English Confession Law
In England, police interrogation is now governed by PACE.17 4
Seeking to strike an appropriate balance between the powers of the
police and the rights and freedoms of the public, PACE provides the
basic framework for the exercise of police authority. 175 The statute
incorporates some common law principles long followed by the
English courts but also includes new provisions dealing with
searches, arrests, detention, investigation, identification, and
176
interviewing.
Recognizing that the primary legislation could not possibly cover
the multitude of problems encountered by the police in conducting
investigations, the government also empowered the Home Secretary
to issue Codes of Practice. These Codes provide detailed regulations
and advice for certain aspects of police procedure. 177 The purpose for
the creation of the Codes of Practice was to provide a guide to the
proper conduct of criminal investigations so that the police and public
would know their respective rights and duties.' 7 8 There are five
Codes presently in operation. 17 9 In the context of a custodial
interrogation, Code C is the most relevant.'8 0 Code C is known as the
Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of
18
Persons by Police Officers. '
The Codes themselves are not statutory instruments and
therefore have no legislative effect.' 8 2 Copies of the Codes, however,
are "kept at all police stations and they are available to detained
suspects upon request."'1 3 Although the breach of a provision of a
Code is not in itself a criminal or civil wrong, courts are obliged to
take into account any provision of a Code relevant to a question
arising under the proceedings before them. 8 4
Further, any
contravention of a Code of Practice may also be a disciplinary offense

174.
See SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that PACE governs police powers
such as questioning a suspect before and after arrest).
175.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and Accompanying Codes of
Practice (U.K.), http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/powers-pace-codes/
pace-code-intro/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) [hereinafter PACE Website]; see also
SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4-5 (stating that PACE provides the framework for the
exercise of police powers while taking into account the public's interest).
176.
SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4-5.
177.
Id.; see also Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 66 (U.K.).
These Codes of Practice can be found on the police force's website. See PACE Website,
supra note 175.
178.
SPRACK, supra note 7, at 5.
179.
PACE Website, supra note 175.
180.
SPRACK, supra note 7, at 5.
181.
Id.
182.
Id. An order made by the Home Secretary brought the Codes into effect and
each Code was approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. Id.
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
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covered by the police discipline regulations. 8 5 Most importantly, if
police obtained evidence against the accused through a breach of the
Code, the court will consider the breach in evaluating the
admissibility of the evidence.18 6 Depending upon the nature of the
breach, the breach alone may make a confession inadmissible or, in
the alternative, be a contributory factor which, taken with other
circumstances, leads to the exclusion of the confession.18 7 Since
PACE was enacted, judges in courts of first impression as well as in
the Court of Appeals have readily exercised their discretion in favor
of the defense, choosing to exclude evidence obtained in violation of
188
the Codes of Practice.
Courts considering the admissibility of confessions evidence
evaluate police conduct for compliance with PACE section 76 and
78.189 The cornerstones of the law governing police interrogation are
reliability and fairness. PACE section 76 provides:
If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in
evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to
the court that the confession was or may have been obtained
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession
which might be made by him in consequence thereof,
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against
him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond
reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be
true) was not obtained as aforesaid.

Applying PACE section 76, courts consider the words or actions that
induced such confession to determine whether the confession made by
the particularsuspect is likely to be unreliable. 190 Questioning that
might be acceptable in the interrogation of an average suspect may
still cast doubt as to the reliability of admissions made by a
particularly vulnerable or inexperienced suspect, such as a child. 191
Section 76 permits judges to exercise considerable discretion in
excluding confessions on the basis of reliability. 192 Section 78 further
develops the courts' power to bar confessions by allowing judges to

185.
Id. at 6.
186.
Id. at 6-7.
187.
Id. at 7.
188.
Id.
189.
See id. at 29 (describing the framework set out by Sections 76 and 78).
190.
Id.
191.
Id.; cf. MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 283 ("[T]he mental handicap of the
accused may properly be considered . . . for the purposes of section 76(2)(b)."). The
leading case is R v. Everett. See Case Comment, Reliability of Confession-Mental
Condition of Suspect: R v. Everett, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 826 (Eng.).
192.
Confession and Breaches of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) (U.K.),
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a to clconfession and-breaches ofCpolice and criminalevid
ence-actl (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
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exercise discretion in excluding evidence that would otherwise be
admissible on the basis that it would be unfair to offer the evidence as
proof in a criminal trial. 193 In English courts, the function of the
judge is to protect the fairness of the proceedings. 194 Because each
case will turn on its relevant facts, the government has been
reluctant to fetter individual judges' discretion by drawing bright line
195
restrictions.
Courts in England routinely exclude confession evidence
196
obtained unfairly by some deceit or trick played on the suspect.
Even before the enactment of PACE, English common law granted
courts the discretion to exclude confession evidence if the police made
misrepresentations to persuade a suspect to make the incriminating
statements. 197
Since PACE was enacted, defendants usually
challenge evidence obtained as a result of a trick as "unfair" under
PACE section 78.198 If the defendant can show that the police acted
in bad faith by making a deliberately deceitful representation, the
court likely will exclude the confession from evidence. 199 In R v.
Mason, the Court of Appeal excluded a confession for such a bad faith
misrepresentation by a police officer. 200 With no direct evidence to
connect the suspect to the crime, the police officer falsely told the
defendant and his solicitor that they had found the suspect's
fingerprints at the scene of the crime. 20 1 After being presented with
this false evidence during his interrogation, the defendant confessed
to the crime. 20 2 The Court of Appeal held that the deceit perpetrated
on the defendant and his solicitor was reprehensible and impacted
the fairness of the trial. 20 3 As the confession was the only definitive
evidence linking the defendant to the crime, the conviction was
20 4
overturned.

193.
Id.
194.
Id.
Id.
195.
196.
See Richard Stone, Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 78 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act: Practiceand Principles,3 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, § 11. 1
(1995), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles3/stone3.html; cf. R v. Houghton, (1978) 68 Crim.
App. 197, 206 (Eng.) ("Evidence would operate unfairly against an accused if it had
been obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused
person or by a trick or by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage.")
(citations omitted); MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 12 (recognizing the "emerging
consensus in official circles" that the kind of tactics "advocated by Inbau, Reid, and
Buckley, as well as being arguably unethical, is also inimical to the gathering of
reliable confession evidence").
197.
MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 199.
198.
Id. at 205-09.
199.
Id. at 206.
200.
R v. Mason, (1988) 1 W.L.R. 139, 144 (Eng.).
201.
Id. at 142.
202.
Id.
Id. at 144.
203.
204.
Id.
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Although express deception by the police during the
interrogation of a suspect is generally prohibited in England, the
courts have found that some types of police deception do not warrant
the exclusion of confession evidence. 20 5 For example, the English
"courts have exhibited a considerable degree of tolerance of
surreptitious tape-recording by ... the police." 20 6 In Bailey, the police
had failed to obtain confessions from two suspects through ordinary
questioning; as a result, the police placed the two suspects in a
bugged cell in an effort to record incriminating statements. 20 7 Before
doing so, the officers acted out a deceptive charade to lull the suspects
into a false sense of security. 20 8 The police officers suggested to the
suspects that they should have been placed in separate cells, but an
20 9
uncooperative custody officer had placed them in the cell together.
Assuming that their conversation would be private, the suspects
made incriminating remarks. 210 The court found that the use of
deception was "merely a detail," refusing to exclude the admissions
211
from evidence at trial.
To facilitate the practice of judicial discretion in excluding
unfairly obtained evidence, Code C also requires that all custodial
interviews be recorded. 2 12
This requirement states that "[a]n
accurate record must be made of each interview, whether or not the
interview takes place at the police station. '2 13 If the interview is
conducted at the station and the police officer chooses to record the
interview by manual notation, the interview must be transcribed
contemporaneously with the questioning on forms specially provided
for that purpose. 214 At the conclusion of the interview, the suspect
should be invited to read the entire record and asked to sign it to
215
indicate that the record is accurate.
As a practical alternative to the time-consuming practice of
manual notation, police routinely tape-record interviews. 21 6 PACE
Practice Code E is entirely devoted to the procedures that police

205.
MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 207.
206.
Id. at 208.
207.
R v. Bailey, (1993) 3 All E.R. 513, 514 (Eng.).
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Code for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police
Officers (Code C), § 11.7(a) (promulgated under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
Act 1984, c.60, § 67, pt. VI (Eng.)) [hereinafter Code C]; see SPRACK, supra note 7, at
38-39 (discussion of the effect of the failure to record an interview on judicial
discretion).
213.
Id.
214.
SPRACK, supra note 7, at 38.
215.

Id.

216.
Cf. Code E, supra note 13, § 3.3 (stipulating when the interviewer may not
audio record and instead record in writing).
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officers must follow in making audio recordings of custodial suspect
interrogations. 2 17 If the suspect has an objection to being recorded by
2 18
video or audio, the suspect may express the objection at the outset.
The interview will then commence without media recording, but a
written record or transcript must still be produced. 2 19
If the
interrogator terminates the use of recording equipment, he must
220
instead comply with the written record requirement under Code C.
Whether the interrogation is recorded in writing or on tape, the
record may be introduced as an exhibit at trial. 221 The substance of
the interrogation may be used by the prosecution to prove that the
defendant made admissions of guilt or the defense to show
consistencies between the defendant's responses to the interview and
the defense's theory of the case. 222
To ensure that recording
requirements are routinely followed by the police, the courts exclude
confessions that are obtained in violation of the recording
2 23
requirement as unreliable under section 76 of PACE.

V. SOLUTION

For decades, scholars have observed that the permissibility of
deceptive police practices leads to false confessions, compromises the
admissibility of valuable evidence at trial, leads police officers to lie
as a first resort, and harms the integrity of the justice system. In an
effort to diminish these widespread effects in the United States, the
legislature should consider reforming interrogation law. Taking a cue
from the English confession law expressed in the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act of 1984, the PACE Practice Codes, and the case law that
has interpreted that sweeping legislation, the new law should
incorporate three basic components.
First, the new law should
empower the courts to focus on the reliability of confession evidence
in determining its admissibility. Second, the law should identify the
deceptive police techniques that produce unreliable results and
encourage courts to exclude unreliable evidence. Third, the new law
should mandate the recording of police interrogations with the

217.

Id.

218.

Id. § 4.8.

219.
220.

Id.
Id.

SPRACK, supra note 7, at 38.
222.
Id.
223.
Id. at 38-39; see also R v. Delaney (1988) 88 Crim. App. 338, 340-41 (Eng.)
(holding that a failure to a compile a contemporaneous record of the bulk of a ninety
minute interview with the defendant was a "flagrant breach of the Code"); cf. R v.
Canale [1990] 2 All E.R. 187 (Eng.) (quashing a conviction because the trial judge
should have acted under section 78 to exclude admissions which had not been
contemporaneously recorded).
221.
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warning that confession evidence may be excluded from trial if those
rules are not followed. By prohibiting the use of certain deceptive
techniques and requiring more safeguards, the law may help to
ensure that police interrogation practices lead to reliable confessions.
A. A Framework with a Focus on Reliability
Following the example of PACE section 76, the legislature should
steer judicial discretion in the direction of reliability. Instead of
analyzing the difficult question of individual voluntariness, the courts
should focus on determining whether a given practice produces
reliable results. Such a shift in focus reflects the understanding that
while a suspect's final admission to an interrogator may be freely
offered, that confession may also be the tainted product of unjust and
unduly provocative means.
The Supreme Court's refusal to definitively address the issue of
reliability should urge lawmakers to make the necessary changes to
confession law, clarifying the circumstances under which a confession
may be excluded. Rather than relying on judges to determine, on a
case-by-case basis, whether certain misrepresentations are coercive
enough to render a particular suspect's confession involuntary, the
law should govern police conduct at the outset. To accomplish this
focal shift from voluntariness to reliability, the law need not
enumerate every possible circumstance in which police deception may
be employed or even establish a per se rule against all types of police
deception. Instead, the legislation should make clear that use of
deceptive tactics that produce unreliable confessions compels the
exclusion of a confession. The legislation should identify certain
types of police practices that frequently jeopardize the reliability of a
confession, while recognizing that the list of prohibited techniques is
not exhaustive. In doing so, lawmakers can assist the courts in
determining whether particular deceptive practices jeopardize
reliability, while simultaneously empowering the courts to make the
determination in those cases where the circumstances call for a factdependant inquiry.
B. ProhibitionAgainst FabricatedPhysical Evidence
and False Testimonial Evidence
Though some have advocated for the creation of a per se rule
against the use of any and all trickery and deceit in police
interrogation, 224 the United States seems far from adopting such a

224.
See, e.g., Daniel W. Sasaki, Note, Guarding the Guardians:Police Trickery
and Confessions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1612-15 (1998) (advocating a per se
prohibition on police of use trickery in investigations).
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rule. Because police officers rely on the ability to build trust and
rapport with suspects during interviews, some level of trickery will
inevitably seep into the questioning. 225 But the law should draw the
line at the presentation of false evidence during an interrogation.
The presentation of false evidence leads not only to a greater risk of
false confession, but also to the increased likelihood of irreparable
evidentiary harm. Although the PACE model stops short of making
an explicit prohibition of false evidence, the case law interpreting
PACE obviates the conclusion that false evidence leads to
unreliability. 226 Similarly, the proposed American legislation should
make clear that the presentation of deliberately misleading physical
or testimonial evidence during a police interrogation may render any
resulting confession unreliable and cause the confession to be
excluded from trial. A policy prohibiting the use of false evidence to
obtain confessions would strike an appropriate balance between the
goal of securing valuable evidence and the need to protect the
227
innocent from coercive police tactics.
Advocates of broad police and judicial discretion may reject such
a policy outright for its limitation on a widely-relied-upon police
practice. Some may argue that the effectiveness of false evidence
techniques justifies their continued use. Although police regularly
secure confessions through the use of deception, it does not follow
that these practices are necessary to solicit confessions. 228 In fact,
one of the best reasons to prohibit the use of false evidence lies in the
fact that police reliance on such a practice may reduce the effort put
into legitimate investigation. 229 Although an outright prohibition
against the use of false evidence would limit a police officer's arsenal
in interrogating the witness, the result will generate more good than
harm. When a prosecutor can offer a confession obtained without
psychological manipulation and fraudulent representations, the
confession is more reliable.

225.
See Leo, From Coercion to Deception, supra note 45, at 45.
226.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
227.
Cf. White, supra note 15, at 149 (advocating limits on deception by
proposing first, that police be prohibited from falsely leading a suspect into believing
that forensic evidence establishes his guilt, and second that courts "closely scrutinize
any tactic that misleads the suspect as to the strength of the evidence against him").
228.
Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275,
1280-84 (2007) (discussing the dispute over the necessity of deceptive interrogation
practices).
229.
Cf. Fred E. Inbau, Should We Abolish the ConstitutionalPrivilege Against
Self-Incrimination?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1385, 1387 (1999) (arguing that
without constitutional restrictions on coercive interrogation practices, there would be
an incentive for police and prosecutors "to sit comfortably in the shade, rubbing red
pepper into a poor devils eyes, rather than go about in the sun hunting up evidence")
(quoting SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND

442 n.1 (1883)).
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Some commentators have suggested that the elimination of
deceptive police interrogation tactics would lead to the prohibition of
police involvement in undercover work. 230
On the contrary,
undercover operations pose none of the dangers discussed above.
When police officers use deception to hide their identity, they create
an opportunity for suspects to act as they would normally. Whether
these undercover strategies are employed before, after, or during
custodial interrogation, the effect is essentially the same. Suspects
feel more comfortable in making admissions that they would never
make if they knew that a police officer was listening. But undercover
strategies likely would not cause a suspect to feel the same amount of
mental anguish or despair that one might suffer if faced with the
presentation of false evidence. Without the presentation of evidence
suggesting guilt, there exists no real compulsion on the suspect to
make any admissions. For this reason, any confession secured
through undercover work would not create the same reliability
problems as a confession secured through the presentation of false
evidence.
Another possible criticism of the proposed plan is that for some
suspects, even rapport-building or sympathetic treatment may be
deceptive enough to push the suspect toward a confession. Although
such tactics may not be enough to make an innocent person confess,
the deception may be sufficient to exercise coercive control over an
especially vulnerable defendant. In these cases, a judge may engage
in a subjective analysis as contemplated by section 76 of PACE.
Under the proposed solution, this type of case-specific analysis is not
necessarily problematic. Although some tactics may be unreliable in
every situation, other tactics may only be unreliable under the
circumstances applicable to a specific suspect. Tactics that the
legislature finds to produce unreliable results, such as the use of false
evidence, should be enumerated in the guidelines. However, even
those tactics that do not prove dangerous enough for outright
prohibition will be subject to judicial scrutiny. With the charge of
determining reliability, judges will exercise discretion in assessing
the appropriateness of specific tactics as employed in individual
cases. When making these determinations, judges may rightfully
consider special circumstances in deciding whether a particular
practice is unreliable.
C. MandatoryRecording
Unless interrogation policies include safeguards for the suspect,
it is unlikely that legislative changes will dramatically alter the

230.
See, e.g., Magid, supra note 3, at 1182 (arguing that a proposal to limit
deceptive interrogation techniques would require a ban on undercover investigation).
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tactics employed by the police. A court's inquiry into the degree of
coercion or trickery employed proves difficult without the ability to
observe the tenor of the interview. 231 When questioned about the
circumstances of an interview, the police officer may be tempted to
"shade the facts to suggest a less coercive environment. '232 One
safeguard, mandated in the PACE Code of Practice C to combat these
problems of proof, involves the recording of every custodial
interrogation. 233 Although the Code does not yet require videotaping,
the goal is clear: In an effort to deter police from employing
prohibited practices and to assure the admissibility of properly
officers must make a recording of
obtained confessions, police
234
interrogation procedures.
In 1990, The National Institute of Justice in the United States
commissioned a nationwide study of the use of videotape by law
enforcement agencies. 235 The study concluded that approximately
"one-third of all U.S. police and sheriffs' departments serving 50,000
or more citizens videotap[ed] at least some interrogations, primarily
236
in homicide, rape, battery, robbery, and drunk driving cases."
Those departments that reported videotaping interrogations said that
they initiated the practice to avoid defense challenges and to reduce
doubts about the voluntariness of the confessions. 237 "Most agencies
experienced resistance from detectives when the practice was
instituted," but disapproval fell to 26% several years later. 238 The
majority of agencies surveyed found that the videotaping practice led
to improvement in the interrogation techniques used by their law
enforcement officers. 239 These agencies also reported that since the
institution of the videotaping practice, defense attorneys had made
240
fewer allegations of coercion or intimidation.
With the exception of Alaska and Minnesota, most states do not
currently mandate any form of police taping. 241 However, the fact

231.
Young, supra note 5, at 462.
232.
Id.
233.
Code C, supra note 212, § 11.7(a); see also SPRACK, supra note 7, at 38-39
(discussing that the requirement of recording interviews is to ensure accurate records
of suspects' statements).
234.
See SPRACK, supra note 7, at 38-39 (discussing how failure to record may
lead to suspect's answers being excluded from evidence); cf. R v. Delaney, (1988) 88
Crim. App. 338, 341-42 (Eng.) (finding that in failing to record the interrogation the
police deprived the judge of the best evidence of what actually happened during the
interrogation and what really made the defendant confess).
235.
ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION, INTERROGATION, AND
DECEPTION 192 (1998).

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
See John E. Reid, Electronic Recording of Interviews and Interrogations,

POLICE LINK, http://www.policelink.com/training/articles/1879-electronic-recording-of-
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that some police departments have voluntarily assumed and
continued the practice of videotaping demonstrates that a videotaping
requirement would not be prohibitively costly or bothersome. Even
242
advocates of police lying do not dispute the ease of videotaping.
One popular interrogation manual begs the question: "In this day and
age of digital cameras, and affordable camcorders, where criminal
trials are nationally broadcast for public viewing and syndicated
television shows allow the public to watch police officers chase
suspects and make arrests, the obvious question arises: Why are
243
criminal interrogations and confessions not routinely videotaped?
Still, objections to mandatory taping abound. 244 Inbau suggests
that police should choose when to tape and when to refrain from
taping to allow privacy. 245 They argue that "the thought of having
one's statements permanently recorded on tape is inhibiting" and that
guilty suspects would not be as likely to tell the truth. 246 The PACE
Practice Codes offer an agreeable compromise to resolve these
concerns. 24 7 If the suspect feels uncomfortable with the presence of
the audio or video recording equipment, he is free to object to its
use. 248 The suspect will be free to speak without the intrusion of a
media operator but will remain protected by the creation of a written
record, 249 which he has the opportunity to review and contest. 250 For
those suspects who desire the protection that recordings may provide,
the requirement will facilitate a hassle-free process. 25 1 Regardless of
whether the suspect chooses to record the interrogation on video or by
the creation of a written transcript, the suspect will be able to use the
resulting record to contest the appropriateness of police tactics in
trial. Similarly, the prosecutor will be able to use that record to
argue in favor of the permissibility of the officer's interrogation
tactics, which saves a legitimate confession from exclusion.

interviews-and-interrogations (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (discussing that most law
enforcement agencies in the U.S. do not record interviews). In Stephan v. State, 711
P.2d 1156, 1164 (Alaska 1985), the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation should result in the exclusion
of the statement. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v.Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994), that custodial questioning should be recorded where
feasible and must be recorded at a place of detention.
242.
See, e.g., IBAU ET AL., supranote 1, at 393.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. at 395-97.
245.
See id. (discussing when recording may be beneficial to the interrogator and
when it may not).
246.
Id.
247.
Code E, supra note 13, § 4.8.
248.

Id.

249.
Id.
250.
Code C, supra note 212, § 11.11.
251.
See Code E, supranote 13 (setting out the procedures for audio recording of
interviews).
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Certainly, videotaping may also be an unwelcome intrusion upon
the police officer's freedom to work without fear of scrutiny.
However, the unpopularity of videotaping among investigators is
arguably all the more reason to require it. When officers know that
the court can review their techniques, they will probably respond by
avoiding misconduct. Videotaping not only ensures that any coerced
confessions are excluded as unreliable but also serves as a valuable
deterrent against misconduct. By preventing police misconduct in the
interrogation room, the practice of videotaping will actually work to
solidify the admissibility of those confessions obtained through
appropriate means.
For decades, commentators have advocated administrative
regulations on police recording, without result. 25 2 The legislature
should take the example of the PACE Code and mandate recording as
a required safeguard under its guidelines for police conduct. Such a
mandate would help to ensure compliance with any legislative
prohibitions against the presentation of false evidence in custodial
interrogations.

VI. CONCLUSION

The harm that results from police use of deception is prevalent
and far-reaching.
In England, the courts have recognized the
problems with dishonesty and Parliament has responded with the
Police and Criminal Evidence Codes. English law has proscribed the
coercive practice of the fabrication of false evidence. Although judges
maintain discretion to assess the reliability and fairness of particular
tactics in context, case law demonstrates that the English courts have
routinely penalized flagrant police deception with the exclusion of
confessions from trial. In the United States, however, the Supreme
Court and legislatures have yet to take significant action in
preventing deceptive police practices. Despite widespread recognition
of the devastating individual and institutional effects of deception,
courts routinely condone lying as sound police policy.
For a system of justice that seeks to presume innocence, the
routine assumption of guilt and practice of dishonesty by police as a
means to uncovering truth hardly seems fitting. Society demands
honesty not just in personal and business dealings, but also in the
practices of its guardians. In an effort to maintain the integrity and
purpose of the criminal justice system, the legislatures must seek to
drive the policies of law enforcement towards the direction of
reliability. By obtaining reliable confessions from the guilty and

252.
See, e.g., Young, supra note 5, at 476-77 (suggesting that requiring
videotaping of police interrogation would help prevent police lying).
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protecting the innocent from overreaching, the police will gain respect
from the public and garner more convictions from solid, admissible
evidence.
From the time that children learn the difference between truth
and lies, they recite the old adage, "honesty is the best policy."
Perhaps now is the time to make honesty police policy in the United
States.
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